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PROTECTING VICTIMS FROM THEMSELVES, BUT NOT
NECESSARILY FROM ABUSERS: ISSUING A NO-CONTACT
ORDER OVER THE OBJECTION OF THE VICTIM-SPOUSE
Robert F. Friedman*
INTRODUCTION
In response to the scourge of domestic violence,1 law enforcement agencies and
prosecutors have been armed with increasingly more aggressive tactics to combat
the abuse.  From implementing mandatory arrest policies for responding officers;2
to the no-drop policies of prosecutors;3 to the variety of protective orders available to
victims;4 the legal response to domestic violence has been expanding.  With these
innovations have come a great deal of advantages5 and some successes in the fight
against domestic violence.6  But these advantages are not without their costs.  This
expansion and increasingly aggressive legal response has taken a toll on relationships7
and victim autonomy.8  This is not to say that these costs are per se unbearable, but the
balance between personal and state interests must be vigilantly monitored.  There is
a line that cannot be crossed: the constitutionally protected interests of the victim.
When mandatory arrest policies, no-drop policies, and criminal protective orders
combine into a single protocol,9 there is a risk that a victim may be railroaded to the ex-
tent that her constitutional rights are violated.  Envision a hypothetical couple married
* J.D., William & Mary School of Law, 2011; B.A., Vanderbilt University, 2007. This
Note is dedicated to the memory of my father, Daniel J. Friedman, from whom I continue
to learn.
1 It has been estimated that one in four women will experience domestic violence in her
life. NAT. COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FACTS 1 (2007), http://
www.ncadv.org/files/DomesticViolenceFactSheet(National).pdf (citing PATRICIA TJADEN
& NANCY THOENNES, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, EXTENT, NATURE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF
INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 9 (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/
181867.pdf).
2 See infra Part I.B.1.
3 See infra Part I.B.2.
4 See infra Part I.B.3.
5 See infra Part I.
6 Id.
7 See, e.g., Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic Violence:
Can Law Help End the Abuse Without Ending the Relationship?, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1487,
1499–1501 (2008).
8 See, e.g., Christine O’Connor, Note, Domestic Violence No-Contact Orders and the
Autonomy Rights of Victims, 40 B.C. L. REV. 937, 946 (1999).
9 See discussion infra Part I.B.4.
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for twenty-five years, living in an apartment building with thin walls and neighbors on
all sides.  One night the wife’s10 husband yells at her, hits her, and throws her against
the wall, prompting a neighbor to call the police.  When the police arrive the wife tells
them that she fell and to not arrest her husband, but the police arrest the husband pur-
suant to a mandatory arrest policy.  Charges are brought against him, but when the
prosecutor asks the victim for cooperation, the victim pleads with the prosecutor to drop
the case.  She refuses to testify for the State.  In fact, the victim states that she will be
testifying for the defense.  Despite losing her star witness, the prosecutor informs the
victim that she will be pursuing the case over the victim’s objection, in accordance with
the jurisdiction’s no-drop policy.
Despite the lack of victim cooperation, the defendant is nevertheless found guilty. 
Then comes the sentencing, and with it a criminal protective order.  The victim objects
to the order, but the judge nevertheless hands it down.  It is a full no-contact order, for
ten years.  If the victim and her husband of twenty-five years attempt to contact each
other in the next ten years, they will be committing a crime.  The victim, who did not
invite the State into her home, and did not cooperate with the State’s prosecution, is
now being told by the State that she cannot see, speak to, or otherwise contact her hus-
band for ten years.  As the tactics used to fight domestic violence expand, a balance
must be struck.
Issuing no-contact criminal protective orders over the objection of the victim-
spouse severely limits the victim-spouse’s autonomy while offering little protection. 
The State is effectively ending a marriage over the objections of the couple.  This runs
afoul of the victim-spouse’s constitutionally protected fundamental right of marriage.11 
The growingly aggressive nature of the legal response to domestic violence should be
welcomed with open arms, but also a watchful eye.  The potential unconstitutionality
of the situation described above is not a condemnation of criminal protective orders,
but instead should serve as an indicator that prosecutorial methods have grown so
aggressive that they have begun infringing upon the protected rights of parties other
than the defendant.12  If the State believes the protection is necessary, then it should
provide it by focusing on the offender and seeking the maximum sentence.
10 The hypothetical involves male on female domestic abuse, but this is not the only type.
A 2000 study conducted by the Department of Justice suggests that in the United States
835,000 men are physically assaulted by an intimate partner annually. PATRICIA TJADEN &
NANCY THOENNES, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE,
AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 26 (2000), available at http://www.ojp
.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/183781.htm. Moreover, domestic violence is not limited to hetero-
sexual couples. “The literature suggests that gay and lesbian couples are about as violent as
heterosexual couples.” Patricia Tjaden, Extent and Nature of Intimate Partner Violence as
Measured by the National Violence against Women Survey, 47 LOY. L. REV. 41, 54 (2001).
11 See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (confirming that “the right to
marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals”).
12 See infra Part III.A.3.
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Part I discusses the evolution of the legal response to domestic violence in America
and current policies.  It discusses the use and effects of mandatory arrest, no-drop poli-
cies, criminal protective orders, and how these can be combined into a single response
protocol.  Part II discusses the constitutional issues that arise when these policies begin
to go too far.  This Note argues that no-contact orders issued over the objection of the
victim-spouse are tantamount to “de facto divorce,”13 and therefore implicate the funda-
mental right of marriage14 and with it, heightened scrutiny.15  It concludes by arguing
that orders issued over the objection of the victim-spouse should be held as unconsti-
tutional under heightened scrutiny.  In conclusion, this Note puts the potential consti-
tutional challenge in the context of the broader effort to fight domestic violence and
recommends that this particular problem be fixed by requiring the consent of a victim-
spouse before a full no-contact criminal protective order is issued.  If the victim will
not consent and the prosecutor believes repeated violence is likely, the focus should
be on incarceration of the abuser.
I. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROSECUTION IN AMERICA
To understand the current state and methods of domestic violence prosecution, it
is necessary to understand the development of the crime of domestic violence and the
legal response.
A. History of the Legal Response to Domestic Violence
As with most of early American law,16 the law regarding domestic violence was
borrowed from England.17  There is little chance that any ship sank under the weight
of these volumes, however, as the early American legal response to domestic violence
was the same as England’s—nothing.18  Under the doctrine of coverture, men had the
power of “domestic chastisement”; that is, they were permitted to use force against
their wives in order to control them.19  In the middle of the nineteenth century some
13 The term “de facto divorce” is taken from Jeannie Suk’s 2006 article Criminal Law
Comes Home, published in the Yale Law Journal. Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home,
116 YALE L.J. 2, 8 (2006), reprinted in JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: HOW THE
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REVOLUTION IS TRANSFORMING PRIVACY (2009). A great deal of the
following argument hinges on this concept. Moreover, Professor Suk’s concerns regarding the
effect of “de facto divorce” on the fundamental right of marriage has served as inspiration to
this Note’s thesis. For both, this Note and its Author are in debt to Professor Suk and her work.
14 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
15 See O’Neill v. Dent, 364 F.Supp. 565, 579 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (applying strict scrutiny to
a regulation prohibiting marriage).
16 15A C.J.S. Common Law § 5 (2002).
17 Laurie S. Kohn, The Justice System and Domestic Violence: Engaging the Case but
Divorcing the Victim, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 191, 195 (2008).
18 Id.
19 Goldfarb, supra note 7, at 1495 (“In this way, the doctrine of coverture did not merely
condone domestic violence; it affirmatively permitted it.”); see also EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL
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courts begin to employ the “rule of thumb,” which stated that “a husband could beat his
wife with a rod no thicker than his thumb.”20  Regardless of the origin of the phrase,21
the “rule” can nevertheless be found used in Mississippi as early as 1824.22
While there were modest improvements in the rights of women throughout the
latter half of the nineteenth century and early parts of the twentieth century,23 it was not
until the late 1960s that domestic violence began to enter America’s social conscience.24 
It would take until the 1970s for the criminal justice system to treat domestic violence
cases as it would a fracas between strangers.25  In 1984, the U.S. Attorney General’s
office presented President Reagan with a report on the failures of the legal system,
addressing domestic violence and recommendations for future improvements.26
G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 62 (3d ed. 2003) (noting
that in the infrequent occurrence that a husband did face a criminal charge for beating his wife,
judges would dismiss the case because the husband was legally allowed to do so).
20 See BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 19, at 62.
21 There is a great deal of controversy as to whether the term originates from this context
(thus rendering the term offensive) or if it finds its origin elsewhere. The former theory remains
popular, albeit seemingly discredited. See WILLIAM SAFIRE, NO UNCERTAIN TERMS: MORE
WRITING FROM THE POPULAR “ON LANGUAGE” COLUMN IN THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE
189 (2003) (noting that the term actually first appeared as far back as 1692 in a work about
fencing and has been mistakenly picked-up as offensive, being attributed to the domestic
violence context).
22 See BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 19, at 62 (citing Bradley v. State, 1 Miss. (1
Walker) 156 (1824)); see also State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil.) 453 (1868) (“His Honor was
of opinion that the defendant had a right to whip his wife with a switch no larger than his
thumb, and that upon the facts found in the special verdict he was not guilty in law.”).
23 See BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 19, at 64 (noting that between 1882 and 1886,
Maryland, Delaware, and Oregon passed laws making it a crime for a man to beat his wife,
though it is believed that they were rarely enforced).
24 Kohn, supra note 17, at 196. In reference to the advances made in the 1960’s, Kohn
notes that “[t]he first wave of domestic violence advocacy efforts focused on opening shelters
for battered women, but legal recourse remained unavailable.” Id.
25 Leigh Goodmark, Law is the Answer? Do We Know That for Sure?: Questioning the
Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 7, 13 (2004).
26 Id. at 13–14 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S TASK
FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE 10–16 (1984)). The opening paragraph of the report is especially
pertinent to the discussion:
As the Task Force conducted its hearings around the country, it became
apparent that now is a time when much progress has been made from
some perspectives—and very little from others. It is a time when police
and prosecutors have become much more aware of the need for action—
and yet the magnitude of the problem appears to be increasing. It is a
time when society’s range of responses has been broadening and becom-
ing more sensitive—and yet much remains to be done before society
resolves some extremely difficult issues involved in determining the
appropriate role for government in dealing with family violence.
Id. at 11.
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The next breakthrough came in 1994 when Congress passed the Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA).27  VAWA was the “first and most comprehensive federal legis-
lation to address violence against women in the history of the United States.”28  VAWA
significantly strengthened the criminal justice system’s response to domestic violence
by creating new felonies, compelling jurisdictions to enforce protective orders issued
in other jurisdictions through the Full Faith and Credit clause, and helping immigrants
who rely on their abusers to establish citizenship.29  Moreover, VAWA included 1.6
billion dollars in federal funding to improve the response methods of law enforcement,
victim services, domestic violence research, and other programs.30  VAWA was reau-
thorized in 200031 and 2006,32 and will be reviewed for reauthorization again in 2011.33
Although primarily identified as a part of a defense theory34 and not a development
in prosecution, battered woman syndrome is a large piece of the development of the
perception and legal treatment of domestic violence in America35 and warrants dis-
cussion.  The term was coined by Lenore Walker in 197936 when she introduced the
Walker Cycle Theory of Violence.37  Walker’s theory is a “tension-reduction theory
that states that there are three distinct phases associated with a recurring battering
cycle: (1) tension-building, (2) the acute battering incident, and (3) love-contrition.”38 
27 Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994).
VAWA was introduced in 1990, but took four years of lobbying and bipartisan work before
it was enacted. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 718 (Nicky Ali Jackson ed. 2007)
(noting also that the Senate Judiciary Committee’s investigation of the sexual harassment
allegations against then Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas and the murders of Nicole
Brown Simpson [former battered wife of O.J. Simpson] and Ronald Goldman may have been
contributing factors in making the time especially ripe).
28 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 27, at 718.
29 Julie Goldscheid, The Civil Rights Remedy of the 1994 Violence Against Women Act:
Struck Down but Not Ruled Out, 39 FAM. L.Q. 157, 157–58 (2005). It is also worth mentioning
that the civil rights remedy provided for in the original act which gave women a civil cause of
action was struck down by the Supreme Court in United States v. Morrison as an unconsti-
tutional use of congressional power. Id. at 158–59 (discussing Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)).
30 See Julie Goldscheid, United States v. Morrison and the Civil Rights Remedy of the
Violence Against Women Act: A Civil Rights Law Struck Down in the Name of Federalism,
86 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 113 (2000). Notably, some of that federal funding goes to support no-
drop policies, which will be discussed later on. Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack,
Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1171, 1188 (2002).
31 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 27, at 720.
32 Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
33 See id.
34 See 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1449 (2006).
35 See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
36 See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 27, at 71.
37 LENORE E. A. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 126 (2d ed. 2000) (refer-
encing her 1979 work).
38 Id.
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Dating back to the 1970s, battered woman syndrome has been used in criminal cases
as part of a defense for the battered defendant.39  “In essence, the claim is that, as a
result of repeated beatings administered by the man, the woman finally reached the
breaking point and assaulted or killed the man.”40  Although testimony of battered
woman syndrome has become more widely accepted in courts throughout the country,
there is still a great deal of controversy surrounding the subject, most notably in the
area of expert witness testimony.41  The appropriate use of battered woman syndrome
testimony in the courtroom may still be unsettled, but its influence in the current per-
ception and response to domestic violence is unquestionable.42
B. Current Prosecutorial Policies and Practices in Response to Domestic Violence
The developments of the past 30 years have resulted in jurisdictions taking a more
aggressive stance in the fight against domestic violence.  Many jurisdictions have cre-
ated distinct departments that specifically handle domestic violence prosecution.43  Out
of this growing trend toward aggressive handling of domestic violence cases, three
39 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 27, at 70. It is important to note
that the syndrome is often mistakenly referred to as a defense. It is not an affirmative defense
in and of itself, but instead is used as evidence to support defense theories. 21 AM. JUR. 2D
Criminal Law § 148 (2008) (stating that the syndrome “is some evidence to be considered
in support of a defense, such as self-defense, duress, compulsion, and coercion.”).
40 34 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 3 (1983).
41 See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 27, at 74–75 (discussing the
differing rules of the admissibility of expert testimony regarding battered woman syndrome);
Erin M. Masson, Annotation, Admissibility of Expert or Opinion Evidence of Battered-Woman
Syndrome on Issue of Self-Defense, 58 A.L.R. 749, 763 (1998) (“The modern trend is to admit
evidence of the battered-woman syndrome; however, many states limit the testimony to the
issue of the defendant’s credibility or to the defendant’s subjective belief in the need to use
force to defend herself.”); see also Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979),
remanded to 455 A.2d 893 (D.C. 1983). Decided by the D.C. Court of Appeals, Ibn-Tamas
was the first case in which the admissibility of battered woman syndrome expert testimony was
at issue. The Court held that expert witness testimony in regards to battered woman syndrome
was admissible as it did not invade the province of the jury, that is, the subject matter was
beyond the understanding of the layman. Id. at 639.
42 See Kohn, supra note 17, at 208. “[S]yndrome evidence has ‘focused on the passive,
victimized aspects of battered women’s experiences.’ If women are perceived as being un-
able to take responsibility for their own actions . . . they will not be seen as active partners in
domestic violence interventions.” Id. (quoting Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and
Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 520, 561 (1992)); see also Friedman & McCormack, supra note 30, at 1188–89
(noting that no-drop policies are partially derived from “a paternalistic realization that the
complainant may face greater danger than she realizes from recurrent violence . . . .”).
43 See Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1861 (1996) (“Specialized domestic violence
units are being established throughout the country.”).
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ubiquitous policies have emerged: mandatory arrest, no-drop policies, and criminal
protective orders.44
1. Mandatory Arrest Policies
Mandatory arrest policies, though better described as a police policy than as a
prosecutorial policy, are a key component in understanding the criminal justice sys-
tem’s response to domestic violence.  Oregon was the first state to enact such a policy,
dating back to 1977.45  In 1982, a study conducted by the Minneapolis Police Depart-
ment and the Police Foundation determined that mandatory arrest policies decreased
the rate of recidivism among offenders.46  Today, almost all states allow officers to
make a warrantless arrest if there is probable cause of domestic violence.47  The degree
of discretion conferred to police, however, is not uniform from state to state.48  “These
statutes can vary in the amount of discretion accorded to the police officer: (1) per-
missive arrest statutes afford police officers considerable discretion; (2) preferential
arrest statutes limit police discretion; and (3) mandatory arrest statutes completely re-
strict police discretion.  Currently, most states have implemented either preferential or
mandatory arrest statutes.”49
The effectiveness and consequences of mandatory arrest, however, are not without
debate.50  Mandatory arrest policies are tools of police and not prosecutors, but it is
44 Kohn, supra note 17, at 199; O’Connor, supra note 8, at 946.
45 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 27, at 460. The original 1977
provision included a clause that arrest was not required if the victim objected to arrest. Inter-
estingly, the clause was omitted in 1979, thus silencing the protest of the victim and requiring
arrest regardless of the victim’s wishes. Id.
46 Kohn, supra note 17, at 213 n.106 (citing Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk,
The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment, in POLICE FOUND. REP. (Apr. 1984), available
at http://www.policefoundation.org/pdf/minneapolisdve.pdf); see also ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 27, at 463–64 (discussing studies subsequent to the
Minneapolis study as well as their results).
47 Kohn, supra note 17, at 213–14.
48 O’Connor, supra note 8, at 942.
49 Id. Notably, many of these states passed this legislation in 1994. G. Kristian Miccio,
If Not Now, When? Individual and Collective Responsibility for Male Intimate Violence, 15
WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 405, 415 (“In 1994, shortly after the indictment of
O.J. Simpson for the murder of Nicole Brown and Ron Goldman, a plethora of states passed
mandatory arrest. With great fanfare, politicians embraced the mantra of the BWM, ‘Zero
tolerance,’ and in thirty-two jurisdictions across the United States law enforcement discretion
was removed in domestic violence cases.”).
50 See Kohn, supra note 17, at 216 (“This legislation authorizes more arrests and, in some
states where arrest is required, limits officer discretion. These policies, in turn, also limit victim
discretion. While the victim’s statement at the scene is relevant to the officer’s assessment of
probable cause, her wishes regarding arrest are irrelevant.”); ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE, supra note 27, at 463–64 (discussing the ongoing debate in regards to mandatory
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important to recognize that the mandatory nature of these policies is the first step in
the aggressive handling of domestic violence cases.51  In some cases, the mandatory
arrest will put wheels into motion that the victim herself did not initiate and cannot
stop.52  The next step in this process, and the natural outgrowth of mandatory arrest
policies, is the development of no-drop policies.
2. No-Drop Policies
Coming on the heels of the mandatory arrest wave, the next major innovation in
aggressive domestic violence case handling was the adoption of no-drop policies.53 
Put simply, a no-drop policy is a mandatory prosecution policy, which like mandatory
arrest policies, limits the discretion of both the victim and law enforcement by pursu-
ing all domestic violence cases where there is evidence of the commission of a crime.54 
This is to say the prosecutor will pursue a case with or without the cooperation of the
victim.55  Also, like mandatory arrest policies, no-drop policies vary in degree and
definition from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.56  “So-called hard no-drop policies never
follow victim preferences to drop charges unless certain criteria are met; soft no-drop
policies permit victims to drop charges under certain limited circumstances, such as
if the victim has left the batterer.”57  Varied or not, the use of no-drop policies, both
official and unofficial, is widespread.58
Several justifications have been put forward in support of pursuing prosecution
over the objection of the victim.  A common argument is that the State has an interest
in prosecuting batterers that simply outweighs the interests of the victim.59  Even if a
arrests and pointing to studies with differing results as to the effectiveness of the policies); see
also Arthur L. Rizer, III, Mandatory Arrest: Do We Need to Take a Closer Look?, 36 UWLA
L. REV. 1, 11–23 (discussing the positive and negative impacts of mandatory arrest policies).
51 See O’Connor, supra note 8, at 949.
52 See infra Part I.B.4 for a discussion on protocols.
53 O’Connor, supra note 8, at 942 (“With stronger arrest policies in place, anti-domestic
violence advocates next turned their attention to reform of prosecution practices.”).
54 BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 19, at 194.
55 Even if the victim is uncooperative, however, the prosecutor still has tools to compel
victim participation as a witness. Id. (“At its most coercive, this policy may compel a victim
to serve as a witness. When carried to its logical conclusion, she may be subpoenaed, and if
recalcitrant, held for contempt of court. Some courts sporadically do indeed issue contempt
of court citations to victims.”).
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 195.
59 Id. (The focus is typically on public safety. “Many prosecutors believe that the goal of
prosecution supercedes the victim’s interests.”); see also Erin L. Han, Note, Mandatory Arrest
and No-Drop Policies: Victim Empowerment in Domestic Violence Cases, 23 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 159, 183 (2003). Han gives a secondary justification for state interest other than
public safety, asserting that the state interest argument “attempts to justify victim-coercive
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victim does not wish to press charges and pursue the case, the governmental interest in
prosecuting the batterer remains.  Another rationale given for no-drop policies is more
victim-oriented, focusing on victim safety and empowerment.60  The argument for no-
drop policies based on victim safety is multifaceted.  Sanctioning batterers, even against
the victim’s wishes, resulting in incarceration or compulsory rehabilitation programs,
can serve to “reduc[e] the likelihood of future battering incidents, let[ ] future potential
victims know that they are consorting with a batterer, and increas[e] the likelihood for
heavier sentencing in the event that a second prosecution occurs.”61  Moreover, there
is a belief that if the batterer realizes that the victim has no control over the prosecu-
tion, they will cease to harm the victim.62  The public interest and victim interest jus-
tifications are not the only rationales offered for no-drop policies,63 but they are the
most prevalent and compelling arguments in support of no-drop policies.
Powerful as the justifications for no-drop policies can be, they also face a great
deal of criticism.64  Much of the criticism focuses on the further disempowerment of
the victim.65  Critics argue that by disregarding the wishes of the victim in respect
no-drop policies on the grounds that they serve the general state interest of ending abusive
relationships and because they encourage equality between men and women. Thus, the sacrifice
of individual victim interests are regarded by these proponents as necessary for overall societal
change.” Id. at 182.
60 See id. at 184 (discussing and rejecting theory that no-drop policies empower victim);
see also Angela Corsilles, Note, No-Drop Policies in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence
Cases: Guarantee to Action or Dangerous Solution?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 853, 874 (1994).
61 BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 19, at 195.
62 Corsilles, supra note 60, at 874.
63 See, e.g., id. Corsilles also refers to another possible rationale for no-drop policies:
The so-called ‘didactic’ function of no-drop policies is also asserted to
impart significant benefits. From the standpoint of legal inaction, no-drop
policies convey to the prosecutor that the victim should not be the ‘leader
of prosecutorial efforts.’ Additionally, it conveys to deputy prosecutors
the strong state interest involved—that the state, and not just the victim,
is harmed by the batterer’s conduct.
Id.; BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 19, at 196 (Buzawa & Buzawa note that productiveness
is another rationale, stating that “although obviously rarely stated as a justification for a no-
drop policy from an organizational perspective, such policies are ‘productive.’ At an organiza-
tional, more than at a societal, level no-drop policies limit unproductive dropped cases, thereby
increasing clearance rates through convictions.”).
64 Not only do critics call into question the rationales put forward by no-drop advocates,
but they also point to mixed results as to their effectiveness. See Kohn, supra note 17, at 237
(“Research also shows mixed results as to whether increased prosecutions and case retention
enhances victim safety. While no-drop prosecution policies have generally increased the
percentage of cases charged and decreased the percentage dismissed, it is not clear that these
policies is to make women safer [sic].”).
65 There are other criticisms of the policies. Buzawa & Buzawa put forward an interesting
argument in criticism of state interests, arguing in part that no-drop policies simply shift the
resources of a prosecutor’s office thereby “diminish[ing] [the] capacity of the organization to
perform other tasks related either to domestic violence or other issues.” BUZAWA & BUZAWA,
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to how the case is handled (or pursued), prosecutors are further disempowering the
victim, thereby exacerbating the effects of domestic violence instead of mitigating
or reversing them.66  “Some critics contend that no-drop policies serve to undermine
battered women’s attempts at empowerment.  By denying a victim the ability to assess
the danger and to make choices for herself and her children, no-drop policies may
serve to further erode a victim’s self-esteem and sense of control.”67  Although it is un-
likely that the controversy regarding the effectiveness and appropriateness of no-drop
policies will be settled anytime in the near future, it can be said that no-drop policies
in effect take one more moving piece out of the legal response to domestic violence. 
This is to say, once the wheels of the justice system have been put into motion (possibly
by a mandatory arrest) any policy that minimizes discretion will make it that much
more difficult to stop—especially by the victim.
3. Protective Orders
In the domestic violence context, protective orders can refer to either civil or
criminal orders.
a. Civil Protective Orders
Civil protective orders, though not the focus of this Note, are a major piece of
the legal system’s response to domestic violence, and as such, merit some discussion. 
Beginning in the mid-1970s courts gained the ability to issue a civil protective order
which acts as an injunction between the parties.68  For a civil protective order to be
issued, the victim must petition the court and show that “the respondent has engaged
in abusive behavior and is likely to do so again in the future.”69  Typically a court will
require both parties to be present in order to grant a protective order,70 but “[i]f the
supra note 19, at 197; see also Corsilles, supra note 60, at 875 (raising other criticisms of no-
drop policies in reference to prosecutorial concerns).
66 See Kohn, supra note 17, at 241 (“When the victim’s preference diverges from the prose-
cution’s agenda, these policies officially render the victim’s voice irrelevant and can result in
a profound sense of disempowerment.”); see also Han, supra note 59, at 184–85 (“Disem-
powerment as a direct result of victim coercive policies can occur in a number of ways.”).
Han goes on to put forth a hypothetical in which a victim changes her story in response to
a no-drop policy and is impeached on the stand by the prosecutor, thus further revictimizing
and disempowering the victim. Id.
67 Corsilles, supra note 60, at 876.
68 Michelle R. Waul, Civil Protection Orders: An Opportunity for Intervention with
Domestic Violence Victims, 6 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 51, 53 (2000).
69 Id. at 54. The exact procedures vary jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but this is the general
approach. As opposed to criminal orders, civil orders require a petitioner to insure that only
interested parties are granted the injunctive relief. See O’Connor, supra note 8, at 949.
70 BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 19, at 234–35. Petitioners typically seek civil protective
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matter is urgent . . . such as the threat of immediate violence, courts may authorize
ex parte orders to remain in effect for a short time without the alleged offender being
present . . . .”71  Although there is no uniform protective order for all jurisdictions, they
all share certain provisions72 and a typical order will either fully or partially restrict the
contact the parties may have.73  Once an order is granted it is typically in effect for one
to two years74 and can be enforced even in jurisdictions outside of the issuing juris-
diction.75  Although civil in nature, if an order is violated it can be a criminal offense.76 
Prior to the expiration of the order, however, the party protected by the order may peti-
tion the court to vacate the order.77  Interestingly, some courts are beginning to deny
petitions to vacate under certain circumstances.78
orders in a general purpose court or a family court and “rely on the civil powers of the court to
judge disputes or a specialized family court’s authority to resolve marital and familial matters.”
Id. at 234.
71 Id. at 235.
72 Protective orders will be enforced as valid if certain elements are present in the order.
The order must name the parties, date of issuance, date of expiration, name of issuing court,
signature of by or on behalf of a judicial officer, and the specific terms against the abuser.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 27, at 583.
73 Id. at 583 (In addition to contact restraints other restrictions can include “prohibitions of
abuse, intimidation, and harassment; child custody determination and visitation issues, man-
dating counseling for the offender; and firearm possession.”).
74 Waul, supra note 68, at 54.
75 See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 27, at 584. This was guaran-
teed by VAWA and requires that the issuing jurisdiction have proper jurisdiction and that the
offender be given notice and opportunity to be heard. Id.
76 Waul, supra note 68, at 54; see also BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 19, at 235
(“Although . . . customarily issued by civil courts, they are directly relevant to the criminal
justice system. Violation in the context of domestic violence is now punishable not only by a
contempt of court finding, it also constitutes an independent ground for justifying, or in many
states mandating, a warrantless arrest.”).
77 See Kohn, supra note 17, at 225–26.
78 See Stevenson v. Stevenson, 714 A.2d 986 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1998) (refusing to
vacate a civil protective order despite petition by the victim). The court lists its duties when
determining whether to vacate the order:
When considering a plaintiff’s request to dissolve the Final Restraining
Order, a court must not forget that it is the public policy . . . expressed
by the Legislature . . . that victims of domestic violence must be assured
the maximum protection from abuse the law can provide; that the official
response to domestic violence, including that of the courts, shall com-
municate the attitude that domestic violent behavior will not be excused
or tolerated; and that it is the responsibility of the courts to protect
victims of domestic violence by ordering those remedies and sanctions
that are available to assure the safety of the victims and the public.
Id. at 992 (emphasis in original). The court goes on to attribute the victim’s request for dis-
solution of the order to stage three of battered woman’s syndrome (love-contrition). Id. at 993;
see also Kohn, supra note 17, at 225–26 (discussing the recent trend in denying petitions to
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b. Criminal Protective Orders
A criminal protective order, as the name suggests, is not sought by the victim in
a civil capacity, but by the State as part of a criminal proceeding against the batterer.79 
Criminal courts have long been vested with the power to issue no-contact orders dur-
ing an ongoing criminal proceeding.80  Although these pretrial orders are not a recent
development, they are not without controversy or criticism.81  The evolution of crim-
inal protective orders in some jurisdictions, however, gives rise to the very issues being
expounded upon in this Note—specifically, “several jurisdictions have given criminal
courts the power to issue permanent and preliminary injunctions and temporary re-
straining orders apart from an ongoing criminal case.”82  This means that criminal pro-
tective orders are not only available as a condition for pretrial release, but can also be
used as part of the sentence upon disposition of the case.83  In one New York juris-
diction, criminal protective orders are continued for up to three years in more serious
cases and for one year in lesser cases.84  The continued orders are typically limited
orders,85 but may remain as full orders86 if the defendant does not agree to certain
vacate); Tamara L. Kuennen, “No-Drop” Civil Protection Orders: Exploring the Bounds of
Judicial Intervention in the Lives of Domestic Violence Victims, 16 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 39,
45–46 (2007) (“[C]ourts should defer to the victim’s decision to vacate, except in the limited
circumstance in which doing so is detrimental to an identifiable third party— specifically,
the victim’s child.”).
79 BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 19, at 235.
80 Id. (stating that because of that power, civil protective orders were rendered moot, but
noting that while criminal orders in this form are an important part of the process, criminal
courts should not be viewed as “an independent vehicle for victim protection” in this regard).
81 See Christopher R. Frank, Comment, Criminal Protective Orders in Domestic Violence
Cases: Getting Rid of Rats with Snakes, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 919 (1996) (scrutinizing criminal
protective orders in the pretrial context).
82 BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 19, at 235.
83 Nichole Miras Mordini, Note, Mandatory State Interventions for Domestic Abuse Cases:
An Examination of the Effects on Victim Safety and Autonomy, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 295, 322
(2004); see also NEAL MILLER, QUEENS COUNTY, NEW YORK, ARREST POLICIES PROJECT:
A PROCESS EVALUATION, 10 (2003) (discussing continued protective orders).
84 MILLER, supra note 83, at 10.
85 A limited order of protection typically allows the defendant to have contact with the vic-
tim, but prohibits further abuse, harassment, or threats to the victim. See LEGAL INFORMATION
FOR FAMILIES TODAY, ORDERS OF PROTECTION 2 (2009), http://www.LIFTonline.org/pdf/en
_protection.pdf [hereinafter LIFT, PROTECTION ORDER]. Although abuse, harassment, and
threats are also punishable crimes independent of the order, if they do occur again, additional
charges may be brought for the violation of the order. “The availability of these orders is a
critical component of the unit’s efforts to prevent repeat offenses. This is because violation of
a protective order by a second assault or threat to assault after conviction of a domestic violence
assault is a felony.” MILLER, supra note 83, at 10.
86 A full order of protection is a complete stay-away order, meaning the defendant may
not have any contact with the victim. See LIFT, PROTECTION ORDER, supra note 85, at 2.
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conditions.87  Moreover, since the victim is not a party to the criminal proceeding,88
she lacks the ability to ask a judge to vacate the order.89  The victim may implore the
prosecutor to issue a limited protective order as opposed to a full protective order so
that she may have contact with the defendant, but the prosecutor ultimately chooses
the type of order sought.90
i. Advantages and Disadvantages of Criminal Protective Orders
Like mandatory arrest statutes91 and no-drop policies,92 criminal protective orders
come with advantages and disadvantages.  A major advantage of a protective order is
the length of protection offered to the victim,93 “Most arrested offenders are released
in a matter of hours or days.  A restraining [protective] order can be valid for an ex-
tended period of time.  In most cases, it is valid for up to three years.”94  Moreover, a
protective order is a judicial order, and as such, carries with it legal consequences if
disobeyed,95 possibly giving pause to offenders before they commit an act in violation
87 MILLER, supra note 83, at 10. An example of a condition that may warrant the court main-
taining the full order of protection is defendant’s refusal to attend an intervention program. Id.
88 See O’Connor, supra note 8, at 962 (“It is important to bear in mind that the victim of
crime is not a party to the criminal prosecution—only the state and the accused stand as parties.
As an alienated third party to the criminal proceedings, the victim and her rights are easily over-
looked.”). The fact that the victim is not a party to the case, however, can also be viewed as an
asset to the prosecution of the case. “Some prosecutors and advocates also assert that no-drop
policies have affected the batterer’s conduct towards the victim. As several of them have ob-
served, some batterers cease harassing their victims after they discover that the victim no longer
controls the case.” Corsilles, supra note 60, at 874.
89 O’Connor, supra note 8, at 962.
90 See LIFT, PROTECTION ORDER, supra note 85, at 5 (“In criminal court, only a prosecutor
can [lift an order]. All the [victim] can do is ask the prosecutor to drop the charges.”); see also
Suk, supra note 13, at 17 (“The practice of criminal courts issuing protection orders pursuant
to the criminal process shifts the decision to exclude an alleged abuser away from the victim
and to the state.”).
91 See supra Part I.B.1 for a discussion on the pros and cons of mandatory arrest policies.
92 See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text (discussing the disadvantages of no-
drop policies).
93 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 27, at 585.
94 Id.
95 The nature and degree of these consequences varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction:
[A] violation of a restraining order in one state may subject the
offender to criminal charges such as invasion of privacy. Entering a house
or building in violation of a restraining order may be considered a crime
of trespassing in another state. In a few states, violation of restraining
orders require the perpetrators to serve a minimum term of confinement.
In other states, violations of restraining orders may affect other related
criminal procedures or sanctions, including bail, pretrial release, probation
revocation, imposition of supervision, and incarceration. Additionally,
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of the order.96  The weight of the court order “may cause some offenders to think twice
before violating an order of the court . . . most offenders have not been issued a direct
order from a judge stating that they shall not engage in certain conduct.  This direct
order from a judge may act as a deterrent.”97  There are other advantages to protective
orders,98 although some pertain only to civil orders.99
The most obvious disadvantage of the order is its form.100  It will only act as a
deterrent so long as the offender places value on the order itself, “If offenders do not
attach any meaning or value to the orders, they become merely pieces of paper that
carry little, if any, force and effect.”101  Further, in most cases a violation must be
some states have created other types of sanctions, such as ordering the
offender to attend counseling, requiring him to be subjected to electronic
monitoring, or requiring him to pay court costs and attorney’s fees in-
curred by the victim seeking a restraining order.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 27, at 583; see also Suk, supra note 13,
at 22–40 for an interesting discussion of the way violations of protective orders can trigger
burglary laws (“[Domestic Violence (DV)] policy, and in particular the idea of presence at
home as a proxy for DV, is transforming burglary law, so that those accused or suspected of
DV are increasingly prosecuted for burglary of their own homes or those of their intimates.”).
96 See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 27, at 585.
97 Id.
98 These advantages are not to be taken as less valuable, but simply are not focused on the
orders’ deterrent effect. “[O]btaining a restraining order can provide victims with peace of
mind. Restraining orders may be issued in response to the victim’s fear of personal injury, past
actual injury, or threat of financial harm.” Id.
99 Buzawa & Buzawa offer a non-exhaustive list of advantages to civil protective orders:
First, the courts have far wider discretion to fashion injunctive relief, un-
like strict sentencing restraints that are typically imposed on many judi-
ciary proceedings. . . . Second, protective orders give the judicial system
an opportunity for prospective intervention to prevent likely abuse. . . .
Third, because violation of an order is now a criminal offense in all
states, the existence of the order itself provides a potent mechanism for
police to stop abuse—that is, the right to arrest and subsequently con-
vict for violations of its terms. . . . Fourth, when the police respond to
a protective order, they may be more inclined to take action to forestall
their own legal liability. . . . Fifth, obtaining a protective order from a
court may have the effect of empowering the victim. . . . Sixth, in many
dimensions, civil protective orders incur far fewer victim costs than crim-
inal prosecution. . . . Seventh, divorce-related injunctive orders have an
additional unique role. . . . Eighth, relief can be far timelier than in
criminal cases. . . . Ninth protective orders can be useful if criminal case
prosecution would be problematic.
BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 19, at 235–39.
100 The order only acts as a deterrent if the defendant perceives it as one. An order will do
nothing to stop a defendant intent on injuring the victim. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE, supra note 27, at 585.
101 Id.
2010] PROTECTING VICTIMS FROM THEMSELVES 249
reported in order to trigger the legal consequences.102  The problem in reporting is
that the offender is in a position to convince or coerce the victim to let the act go
unreported.103
ii. The Effectiveness of Criminal Protective Orders
In addition to the many advantages and disadvantages of protective orders, there
is also concern and controversy over their effectiveness.104  Several studies have been
conducted in an attempt to determine the effectiveness of orders, but the studies vary
in their results.105  Some studies suggest that while protective orders may have little
positive impact in their ability to prevent reabuse, they are effective in the sense that
“women feel ‘empowered’ or ‘protected’ by such orders, and the lifting of fear is it-
self valuable.”106  Effectiveness in that sense is a very real and important product of
protective orders and should in no way be discounted or underestimated.  It is impor-
tant to note, however, that this definition of effectiveness does not include curtailment
of future violence.  It is safe to say that it remains “extraordinarily difficult to deter-
mine generally the efficacy of restraining orders.”107  When a criminal order is issued
over the objection of the victim, however, whatever “effectiveness” an order can have
from empowering the victim, is at best negated and at worst counterproductive.108
102 It should be noted that certain jurisdictions do conduct random checks to ensure that the
order is being obeyed in an effort to combat this drawback. “[T]he Dallas Police Department
has begun randomly selecting a number of domestic violence victims who were issued pro-
tective orders, to whom detectives from the Domestic Investigation and Sex Crimes units
mail letters and follow up with home visits.” Michael T. Morley et al., Developments in Law
and Policy: Emerging Issues in Family Law, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 169, 219 (2003); see
also Suk, supra note 13, at 50 (“Police officers then [after an order is issued] make routine
unannounced visits to homes with a history of domestic violence. If a defendant subject to a
protection order is present there, he is arrested.”).
103 See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 27, at 585 (“If the offender
convinces or threatens the victim not to report the violation to the police, law enforcement
officials will be unaware that the offender has violated the order.”).
104 Note that the majority of the research and literature concerning the effectiveness of
protective orders focuses on civil orders. Waul, supra note 68, at 53–54 (“The literature on
protective orders has typically focused on the effectiveness of [civil protective orders] in
deterring the batterer from future violence.”).
105 See BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 19, at 242–43 (discussing the findings of studies
done ranging back to 1985); ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 27, at 586
(discussing two such studies); Waul, supra note 68, at 54 (discussing the effectiveness of pro-
tective orders, noting that “[t]he research on this question has revealed mixed results”). One
possible explanation for the mixed results is that the studies define effectiveness differently.
BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 19, at 243.
106 BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 19, at 243.
107 Id. at 245.
108 O’Connor discusses this at length in her Note, arguing that the issuance of protective
orders over the objection of the victim can infringe on her autonomy rights, in some ways
reversing the effects that these orders are meant to enhance. O’Connor, supra note 8, at 962.
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4. Synthesis of Policies into a Single Protocol
Mandatory arrest, no-drop policies, and criminal protective orders are often treated
independently when examined by legal scholars.109  This can certainly be an appropriate
approach in understanding how each policy operates in theory and practice, but can
also run the risk of not seeing the forest for the trees.  When these policies are em-
ployed together, as they are in the most aggressive jurisdictions,110 they are not just
independent developments in the evolution of domestic violence—they are the first,
second, and third steps111 in a domestic violence protocol.112  When all three policies
are employed in a protocol, the sum can be greater than their parts.113  Taken as a
protocol, there is a possibility that a victim, without inviting state intervention114 or
109 See supra Part II.B.1–3.
110 See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 83, at 8–13 (describing the domestic violence protocol
in Queens County, New York).
111 First, “police are required to arrest suspects in most domestic violence cases where they
have probable cause to arrest.” Id. at 6. Second, “[t]he arrest papers are then sent to the District
Attorney’s Intake Unit.” Id. at 7. Third, “[t]he court’s order of protection is continued after
conviction.” Id. at 10; see also O’Connor, supra note 8, at 956 (“Statutorily mandatory no-
contact orders do not provide a mechanism or procedure for incorporating the concerns or
wishes of the victim.”).
112 See Suk, supra note 13, at 42–50 (discussing enforcement protocol and criminal pro-
tective orders).
113 There is a joke about passengers on an old four-propeller plane. During flight, one of
the four engines goes out, prompting the captain to announce that due to the decrease in power,
the flight will land an hour later than expected. Soon after, the second engine goes out and
the captain announces that landing will now be two hours later than expected. Following that
announcement, the third engine goes out and the captain announces that the flight is now three
hours behind schedule. At this point a passenger turns to the man sitting next to him and says,
“Gosh, if the fourth engine goes out, we’ll be up here all day.” Treating each engine failure
independently is only appropriate up until a point. When discussing the remaining working
engine, however, continuing to treat it independently of the other three is a failure to understand
that in conjunction with the other three, the breakdown of the fourth has much greater implica-
tions (the plane will crash) than the consequences of one engine failure multiplied out by four.
Likewise, in the domestic violence context, a treatment of mandatory arrest policies may
still allow the victim to control the prosecution or at least not be directly affected by the dis-
position of the case. A treatment of no-drop policies may assume that the victim invited state
intervention at the arrest stage and may not be directly affected by the disposition of the case.
A treatment of criminal protective orders at sentencing may assume invitation of state inter-
vention and control over the prosecution. When all three are employed in conjunction, however,
the implications are greater than the three measures taken independently, as the victim is at the
full mercy of the State at every stage.
114 A 911 call is a request for the State to intervene, but it does not always come from the
victim. See Suk, supra note 13, at 59 (“The arrest may have come at the behest of neighbors
rather than the victim herself. Or the victim may have called the police to seek specific inter-
vention in that moment.”). It is also worth noting that 911 calls from people other than the
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controlling the manner of state intervention,115 can be left protected by a criminal order
that makes it impossible to see their spouse for years.116  When all three policies are
combined into a single protocol,117 a unique problem is created as a result of the com-
bination itself that cannot be seen by treating each policy independently.  Mandatory
arrest, no-drop policies, and criminal protective orders independently allow a victim to
have some control over her relationship during state intervention at the pre-prosecution,
prosecution, or post-prosecution stages.118  Taken together, however, a victim could
potentially be left completely voiceless during the pre-prosecution and prosecution
stages, but nevertheless be left named on a criminal protective order, which lasts for
years.119  This means the State can effectively end a relationship120 that the victim
voluntarily wants to be a part of, without the victim having invited state intervention,
participated in the manner of state intervention, or had a voice in the lasting legal
consequences of state intervention.
victim are more likely to occur in urban areas. “The initial DV arrest . . . is much more likely
to occur if people live in close quarters in buildings with thin walls, and neighbors can easily
hear a disturbance and call the police.” Id. at 59–60.
115 No-drop policies mean that the prosecution can proceed irrespective of the wishes of the
victim. See Han, supra note 59, at 181–85 (discussing the drawbacks of no-drop policies).
116 See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 83, at 10. Miller reports that in Queens County, New York,
“[t]he court’s order of protection is continued after conviction as a limited order of protection
for a period of up to three years in Misdemeanor A cases and one year in lesser cases,” and
further notes how this limited order may become a full order if certain conditions are not met
by the defendant. Id.
117 New York City is an example of a jurisdiction which employs mandatory arrest policies,
no-drop policies, and criminal protective orders in the sentencing stage all. See MILLER, supra
note 83 (evaluating the domestic violence policies in Queens County, New York); see also Suk,
supra note 13, at 42 (“I turn to a leading jurisdiction, New York County (i.e., Manhattan),
that is considered to be ‘in the forefront of efforts to combat domestic violence,’ and that has
seen significant changes in its enforcement approach in the last decade.”).
118 At the pre-prosecution stage, i.e., when the police arrive at the scene, if not for a manda-
tory arrest policy the victim would have some control over whether the offender was arrested.
See Hanna, supra note 43, at 1857–60 (discussing the history of the effect of victim objection
to arrest). In the prosecution phase, no-drop policies are just one end of the spectrum. “On the
other end of the spectrum, deferential drop jurisdictions defer completely to the wishes of the
victims, routinely dropping charges according to victim desires.” Han, supra note 59, at 181.
At the post-prosecution phase, meaning the sentencing and beyond, “[t]he discretion accorded
to the court with respect to the issuance of a criminal protective order, including which con-
ditions to stipulate, varies by jurisdiction.” O’Connor, supra note 8, at 947.
119 See O’Connor, supra note 8, at 949 (“[M]ost criminal protective orders do not require
that a specific petitioner be named. In some states, the victim’s name will appear as the peti-
tioner only because statutory requirements allow members of the criminal justice system to
file in the victim’s name.” (citations omitted)).
120 See Suk, supra note 13, at 42–64 (arguing that unwanted criminal no-contact orders
issued in sentencing can operate as “de facto divorce”).
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES ARISING FROM CRIMINAL PROTECTIVE ORDERS AS
PART OF A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROTOCOL
A domestic violence protocol that potentially silences a victim at every stage not
only gives rise to questions about its effectiveness and appropriateness,121 but also its
constitutionality.  Although “[t]he Constitution does not specifically guarantee crime
victims particular rights,”122 the victim’s Fourteenth Amendment rights123 can still
potentially be violated.124
A. A Fundamental Right Violated
If a criminal protective order which separates a married couple is viewed as state
imposed “de facto divorce,”125 then the fundamental right to marry is invoked.126  Once
a fundamental right is found to be inhibited, the court will use a heightened standard
of review in its analysis as to whether the law is constitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment.127
1. “De Facto Divorce”
In her 2006 article Criminal Law Comes Home,128 Jeannie Suk introduced the
concept of “de facto divorce.”129 Suk argues the effect of a final criminal order of pro-
tection130 is in essence an informal divorce:
121 See supra Part I.B.4.
122 O’Connor, supra note 8, at 962. O’Connor goes on to add some historical reasons for this:
At the time of the Constitution’s creation, private prosecution was the
means of enforcing the criminal law, with the victim typically serving as
both prosecutor and punisher. Thus, the Framers likely presumed that
victim’s rights would be protected by the role the victim played in the
prosecutorial scheme. Public prosecutors replaced victims as the initiator
of criminal investigation, providing a neutral participant, distant from
the parties and facts of the particular case. Gradually displacing the
belief that the wrong was done first to the victim and then to the state,
public prosecution on behalf of the state became the norm and victim’s
rights, formerly secured by the victim’s role in the prosecution, were
left unprotected.
Id. at 962–63.
123 Id. at 962–63.
124 See infra Part II.A.3 (discussing a potential challenge).
125 Suk coined the term and brought forth this theory of a constitutional challenge in her
2006 article that focuses on the same type of domestic violence protocol as this article. Suk,
supra note 13.
126 Id. at 64.
127 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (applying “critical examination”).
128 Suk, supra note 13.
129 Id. at 8.
130 The final order of protection is another name for a criminal protective order handed down
at sentencing that remains in effect long after the criminal proceeding has ended. See id. at 53–54.
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The full and final order of protection prohibits contact between
the parties, and violation of the order constitutes commission of a
fresh crime.  It is unlawful for the party subject to the order to see
or to speak to his spouse, or to go to the home in which they reside
together.  Even a phone call, letter, or e-mail risks arrest and crim-
inal charges.  Regardless of whether parties are formally married,
it is therefore criminal for them to continue, in any substantive
way, their marital, domestic, or intimate relationship.  With these
prohibitions, the state—the prosecutor and the criminal court—
effectively seeks to impose de facto divorce.131
Suk goes on to note that while de facto divorce is not de jure divorce132 in that it is not
a formal divorce, in many ways it goes further than a formal divorce.133  Not only can
there be no contact by either party,134 but it “need not be initiated by either of the parties
to the relationship.  Unlike actual divorce, in which a general principle of autonomy
governs so that one or both parties in the marriage must initiate it, here the separation
is forced by the State. Neither party’s consent is required.”135  It is, as Suk puts it,
“super-divorce.”136
In reality, some couples simply disregard the protective orders and continue to live
together despite the criminal order.137  Despite the decision of the parties to disregard
the order,138 they still run the risk of criminal consequences as police officers do make
random checks and will arrest parties that are not in compliance with the order.139  As
a result, those couples that disregard the orders and continue in their relationships “live
in marriages or intimate relationships whose practical continuation is criminal.”140 
Viewing a criminal protective order as “de facto divorce” then, it follows that such
orders can interfere with the fundamental right to marry.
131 Id. at 56.
132 Suk notes that unlike common law marriage, there is no common law divorce. Id. at
57 n.238.
133 Id. at 58.
134 Contact cannot occur “even by express permission of the protected party.” Id.
135 Id. Also note that parties cannot contract around the conditions as they would in a formal
divorce. Id.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 60.
138 Reasons to disregard the order may not always be simple. Suk notes how “sophisticated
users of the DV and criminal justice systems could use the protective order as a strategic threat
within the intimate relationship.” Id. at 61–62.
139 Id. at 60–61.
140 Id. at 61.
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2. The Fundamental Right to Marry and Heightened Review
In the seminal case of Loving v. Virginia,141 the Supreme Court struck down
Virginia anti-miscegenation laws after an interracial couple convicted under the laws
brought a Fourteenth Amendment challenge.142  In Loving, the Court defined the
right to marry as a fundamental right.143  The Court’s decision focused on racial dis-
crimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause144 and not the fundamental
right of marriage in the Due Process Clause,145 “[b]ut the Court went on to hold that
the laws arbitrarily deprived the couple of a fundamental liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause, the freedom to marry.”146
In the 1978 case Zablocki v. Redhail,147 the Supreme Court struck down a
Wisconsin statute148 that provided that certain couples may not marry without a
court’s permission.149  “The class is defined by the statute to include any ‘Wisconsin
resident having minor issue not in his custody and which he is under obligation to sup-
port by any court order or judgment.’”150  In determining the level of scrutiny, Justice
Marshall, delivering the opinion of the Court, found that “critical examination” was
the appropriate measure.151  The Court began by discussing the Equal Protection
Clause aspect of the case,152 but then proceeded to discuss the fundamental right to
marriage, and its bearing on the Due Process clause.153  Having established that mar-
riage is a fundamental right and a form of heightened review was the appropriate level
of scrutiny,154 the Court stated that a statute “cannot be upheld unless it is supported
by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those
interests.”155  The Court went on to find the statute insufficiently tailored to the state
141 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
142 Id.
143 Id. at 12.
144 Id. at 11.
145 Id. at 11–12.
146 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (commenting on Loving).
147 Id. at 374.
148 WIS. STAT. §§ 245.10 (1), (4), (5) (1973).
149 Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 375.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 383.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 383–88. The Court also discussed marriage in the privacy context of the Due
Process Clause. “More recent decisions have established that the right to marry is part of the
fundamental ‘right of privacy’ implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”
Id. at 384. The Court went on to discuss Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the
groundbreaking case that found a right of privacy implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment.
Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384.
154 Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388.
155 Id.
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interests and struck down the statute.156  Interestingly, however, as Justice Stewart
pointed out in his concurring opinion, the Court’s opinion technically rested on Equal
Protection grounds, and not substantive due process.157  Moreover, Justice Marshall
pointed out that not all regulations on marriage will be subject to strict scrutiny.158  For
a statute to trigger strict scrutiny, then, it seems that it must “interfere directly and
substantially with the right to marry.”159
Regardless of any “obfuscation”160 in the majority’s opinion in Zablocki, a con-
crete rule does seem to emerge: the Court considers the right to marry a fundamental
right, and if that right is substantially interfered with, the Court will apply strict scru-
tiny in which it will determine if the law is narrowly tailored to state interests.
3. “De Facto Divorce” as a Constitutional Challenge
Return to the hypothetical posed at the beginning of the Note: a victim-spouse
who did not call the police, did not participate in the prosecution of her husband, and
objected to the no-contact criminal protective order.  In this case the victim-spouse’s
autonomy over her family structure was disregarded as a result of a domestic violence
protocol that included mandatory arrest, a no-drop policy, and the issuance of criminal
protective order at sentencing.  Is there a potential constitutional challenge?
Although constitutional challenges regarding protective orders and the right to
marry are exceedingly rare,161 Suk points to an unpublished decision from the
156 Id. at 388–91. The Court pointed to evidence that the statute was originally enacted as a
way to ensure that people with child-support obligations would receive counseling before
entering into a new marriage, and once counseling was given, permission was automatically
granted. Id. at 388. The Court was quick to point out, however, that there is nothing in the
statute mentioning counseling, and is therefore not narrowly tailored to that end. Id. Another
state interest put forward is that of the welfare of out-of custody children, but the Court found
the statute as a means of collection to be overly broad. Id. at 389. The Court found that for
those too poor to pay the child support, the statute simply served to prevent marriage, and did
nothing to help collect. Id. at 389. The Court also noted that there are many other ways for the
State to achieve its interest in collecting the funds that are far less intrusive than the marriage
ban. Id. As to the argument that the statute prevents those who owe child support from taking
on further financial obligations, the Court found the statute to be grossly underinclusive, as
the statute did not limit assuming other financial obligations. Id. at 390.
157 Id. at 395–96 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“The Court is understandably reluctant to rely
on substantive due process. But to embrace the essence of that doctrine under the guise of
equal protective serves no purpose but obfuscation.” (citations omitted)).
158 Id. at 386 (majority opinion) (“[R]egulations that do not significantly interfere with deci-
sions to enter into the marital relationship may legitimately be imposed [without triggering
strict scrutiny].”).
159 Id. at 387.
160 See id. at 396 (Stewart, J., concurring) (discussing the problems with the majority
opinion).
161 See Suk, supra note 13, at 64 n.265 (“One might expect extensive litigation on this
question, [the constitutionality of state imposed ‘de facto divorce’] but the opposite appears
to be the case.”).
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Washington Court of Appeals that is on point, albeit raised by the defendant and not
the victim-spouse.162  In State v. Ross,163 the defendant, convicted of felony harass-
ment and two counts of assault,164 argued on appeal, among other things,165 that the
no-contact order handed down in sentencing unconstitutionally violated his right to
marry.166  After Ross was convicted of the initial charges but before his sentencing, he
married the victim,167 thus violating the standing no-contact order.168  In response, the
judge issued a ten year no-contact order naming Ross’s wife, which she opposed.169 
In determining the constitutionality of this order in the face of the defendant’s right to
marriage, the court correctly identified marriage as a fundamental right.170  The court
went on to identify the State’s compelling interest as preventing future crimes.171  With
respect to the standard of review to be applied, the court seemed to use strict scrutiny,
though not explicitly.172  However, the court was extremely brief in its application and
conclusory in its discussion, deeming that the lower court’s decision to issue the no-
contact order furthered the State’s interest and no less intrusive alternative existed.173 
As to the defendant’s assertion that assault statutes already serve the State’s interest
in preventing future violence,174 the Court responded that no-contact orders go even
further to accomplish this end.175  Suk noted that “[t]he Ross court was strikingly
nonchalant about the interference of the no-contact order with the right to marry be-
cause it accepted the imperative to separate couples when DV [domestic violence]
162 Suk originally discussed this case, noting the fact that it has remained unpublished
“notwithstanding its evident relevance to the areas of criminal law, family law, and consti-
tutional law.” Id. at 64–65 (discussing State v. Ross, 1996 WL 524116, at *1 (Wash. Ct.
App. Sept. 16, 1996)).
163 1996 WL 524116 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 1996).
164 Id. at *1.
165 Ross also argued that the court abused its discretion by improperly admitting hearsay
and that the court lacked the authority to condition the length of the no-contact order on his
completion of a counseling program. Id.
166 Id.
167 Id. at *2.
168 Id. (the violated no-contact order was issued for the duration of the proceedings, and was
not part of sentencing).
169 Id. at *2. The court stated that “[t]he fact that Burke [Ross’s wife] opposes the no-contact
order in this case does not change th[e] fact” that the State’s interests are furthered by the no-
contact order. Id. at *4.
170 Id. at *3. The court cited Zablocki, among other cases, as recognizing marriage as a
“fundamental constitutional right.” Id.
171 Id. at *4 (citing Westerman v. Cary, 892 P.2d 1067 (Wash. 1994)).
172 Id. at *3 (“The State may interfere with that right, however, when important state interests
are at stake, the restriction actually furthers those interests, and no less intrusive alternative
exists to advance those interests” (citing Vanu v. Rice, 524 F.Supp. 1297 (S.D. Iowa 1481))).
173 Id. at *4; see also Suk, supra note 13, at 65.
174 Ross, 1996 WL 524116 at *4.
175 Id.
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is involved.”176  Not only has the opinion remained unpublished, but “[t]he court’s
tone and brevity suggested that it perceived the case as a nearly frivolous claim of the
kind that the courts constantly dispose of with cursory analysis.”177  Although the
claim was brought by the defendant and not the victim, the case does confirm the
standard of review that should be applied to a challenge based on “de facto divorce”-
type reasoning.  That said, the court dispenses of the argument far too heedlessly for
a strict scrutiny review.
Returning to the hypothetical, the court should find the order in that situation un-
constitutional.  The court in Ross was far too hasty in its application of strict scrutiny. 
The court asked the right questions,178 but answered them in conclusory fashion.179 
The court states that “[b]y making even non-assaultive contact unlawful and punish-
able, the no-contact order goes much further than the assault statute toward prevent-
ing violent acts.”180  The Ross court’s ruling must have hinged on this assertion, since
if the no-contact orders do not work to satisfy the State’s interest in preventing future
violence, they would be found unconstitutional under strict scrutiny.181  Despite the
assertion that no-contact orders prevent future violence serving as the crux of the
court’s reasoning, the court offered no empirical data or evidence to suggest that it
was true.182  The court simply relied on its own intuition that no-contact orders work,
despite evidence that this may not be the case.183
Judicial intuitions aside, however, studies of the effectiveness of criminal protec-
tive orders have shown mixed results,184 and in fact have shown that they do little to
prevent reabuse.185  Despite other positive effects of the orders,186 if they do not prevent
reabuse, then they cannot further the State’s interest in preventing future violence.  If
they do not further the State’s interest, then the orders should fail under strict scru-
tiny.187  Even if a court faced again with the question will not go as far as to invoke
176 Suk, supra note 13, at 65.
177 Id.
178 Namely, is the State’s interest compelling and is it furthered by the restriction? Ross,
1996 WL 524116 at *3–4.
179 The court simply stated what the order purports it will do, and nothing about whether it
accomplishes this goal. Id. at *4.
180 Id.
181 Id. (“The State may interfere with that right [marriage], however, when important state
interests are at stake, the restriction actually furthers those interests . . . . That interest [prevent-
ing future violence] is furthered by a no-contact order that prohibits a violent offender from
contacting his victim for a period of time.”).
182 See Ross, 1996 WL 524116.
183 See supra Part I.B.3.b.ii and accompanying text for the discussion on the questionable
effectiveness of protective orders.
184 See supra note 105 for a discussion of the results of different studies.
185 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
186 See discussion supra Part I.B.3.b.i (discussing the advantages of the orders).
187 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1977) (stating that when a fundamental right
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the studies that show that protective orders do not prevent reabuse,188 at the very least
they should acknowledge that the results are unquestionably mixed.189  The discrep-
ancy in results is indication enough that even if the no-contact orders can further the
State’s interest in some cases, it is not enough to satisfy strict scrutiny’s requirement
of a narrowly tailored means-ends nexus.190
Moreover, if there is a less intrusive alternative to furthering the State’s interest,
the challenged measure will be found unconstitutional under strict scrutiny.191  The
court in Ross suggests that the no-contact order is the method of preventing future vio-
lence that is the least intrusive to the fundamental right to marriage.192  It dispenses
with the defendant’s arguments that assault statutes are already deterrent enough,193 and
that counseling would be less intrusive,194 by stating that neither adequately achieves
the goal of preventing future violence as well as no-contact orders.195  But there is a
rather obvious alternative the court overlooks: incarceration.  As counterintuitive as
this may seem, even jail would be less intrusive to the relationship than a mutually
unwanted protective order.196  “[P]risoners are normally allowed to have some contact
through which they can maintain their relationships.  For example, they can write and
receive letters, make phone calls, and have visitors, all of which would be criminal
under a no-contact order.”197  It would be implausible that any court would find a piece
of paper a better means of preventing future violence than incarceration, yet incarcera-
tion would be less intrusive to a marriage.
There is little question that there are situations in which the risk of repeated vio-
lence is so clear that it appears almost inevitable.  There is also little doubt that a victim
is interfered with, a statute “cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important
state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests”).
188 See supra note 106 and accompanying text for a discussion of the results of different
studies.
189 See supra note 105 and accompanying test.
190 See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388.
191 Ross, 1996 WL 524116 at *3 (describing the requirements of passing a heightened
review standard).
192 Id.
193 Id. at *4. The court stated that defendant’s argument that existing assault statutes serve
as a less intrusive alternative “ignores the broader scope of no-contact orders.” Id. Adding
that “[b]y making even non-assaultive contact unlawful and punishable, the no-contact order
goes much further than the assault statute toward preventing violent acts.” Id.
194 Id. The court stated that counseling in lieu of a no-contact order would “allow Ross to
contact Burke before he had successfully completed treatment.” Thereby “creat[ing] a greater
risk of reoffense than the arrangement Ross challenges.” Id.
195 Id.
196 See Suk, supra note 13, at 65–66 (discussing incarceration’s effect on the right to
marriage).
197 Id. at 65. Suk goes on to note that “even incarceration, which undoubtedly burdens the
relationship, does not seek to end it.” Id.
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will not always be able or willing to remove herself from the relationship.  But if it
is the case that reabuse is almost certain and the victim refuses to consent to a no-
contact order, then the answer lies in incarcerating the offender, not disregarding the
voice of the victim.  Not only does this respect the constitutional rights of the victim-
spouse, but focuses on punishing the responsible party.  It is unlikely the victim-spouse
will support incarceration, but the State need not pay heed to every preference of the
victim.  It is the State’s duty and prerogative to punish violent offenders as long as it
does so without abridging the rights of an innocent party.
It is important to recall that this discussion and standard of review is only relevant
to the “de facto divorce” scenario in which the order is issued over the objection of the
victim-spouse.  The court in Ross stated that the victim’s opposition to the order is
irrelevant,198 but this misses the mark.  It is only because the victim opposes the order
that strict scrutiny must be applied in the first place.  Strict scrutiny is only applied
because the victim-spouse’s fundamental right to marriage is being infringed upon by
State mandated “de facto divorce.”  If it is not a “de facto divorce”199 scenario, in that
the victim-spouse consents to the order, then a fundamental right is not encroached
upon since there is no fundamental right to be married to someone who does not wish
to be married to you.200  Given the above hypothetical, however, using Suk’s theory
of “de facto divorce,”201 strict scrutiny should be applied and the victim-spouse should
be successful in her constitutional challenge.  Under strict scrutiny, criminal protec-
tive orders lack a sufficiently narrowly tailored connection to the State’s interest in
preventing future violence.
CONCLUSION
The constitutional issues discussed above are limited to certain hypothetical
conditions that oblige some explanation.  First, this Note expounds upon the consti-
tutional rights of the victim-spouse yet criticizes the opinion in Ross, a case in which
the defendant raised the claim.202  This is because the arguments used in Ross and
the manner in which the court frames them are the same as those that would be used
in a hypothetical claim brought by the victim-spouse.  As to whether the defendant,
as in Ross, has reciprocal rights and potential challenges are questions for another
198 Ross, 1996 WL 524116, at *4.
199 See Suk, supra note 13, at 8.
200 The cases that establish the right to marry as a “fundamental right,” e.g., Loving and
Zablocki, deal with the mutual assent to marry. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1977);
Loving v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 1 (1967).
201 This is consistent with Ross in that the court in Ross found it appropriate to apply strict
scrutiny as the fundamental right to marriage was invoked. Ross, 1996 WL 524116 at *3.
202 Id. at *1.
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day.203  Second, the potential challenge outlined above assumes that children are not
involved in the domestic violence.204  Finally, the above situation addresses criminal
protective orders as part of a domestic violence protocol that includes mandatory arrest
and no-drop policies, in which the victim did not participate at any level.  It very well
may be the case that the constitutional challenge would be successful even if the vic-
tim did participate earlier in the process, but it may also be that this would change the
analysis since the victim in some sense initiated205 or ratified206 the state interference. 
As it stands, however, this Note has the luxury of loading the victim-spouse’s deck with
hypotheticals and potentialities.  How far the argument put forth can stray from the
controlled hypothetical conditions is uncertain, but the fact that this potential challenge
exists should give rise to some very real concerns.
The potential constitutional challenge outlined in the previous section is not meant
to serve as an indictment of current prosecutorial methods, but instead as a measuring
stick of how far they have come.  The fix for the outlined challenge is simple: require
that the victim-spouse consent to the no-contact order, and if the victim-spouse does
not, seek the statutorily allowable jail sentence.  This may limit prosecutors more than
they would like in certain circumstances, but the outlined challenge shows that the
prosecutor may be constitutionally compelled to accept such a compromise.
Domestic violence is an extremely serious problem and the aggressiveness with
which some jurisdictions have begun combating it should be applauded.  Regardless,
being on the forefront of increasingly more aggressive policies comes with responsi-
bilities.  The potential constitutional challenge described is a strong indication that
the expansion of prosecutorial methods to combat domestic violence has gotten to
the point where it may begin infringing upon other protected rights.207  As with any
expanding practice, those on the vanguard must be vigilant in asking: how far is too
far?  Criminal protective orders mandating no-contact over the objection of the victim-
spouse is too far.
203 Whether the defendant’s crime affects the constitutional analysis is a broader question
than this Note purports to answer.
204 Sadly, it is all too often the case that children are involved. A 2002 study estimates that
between 3.3 million and 10 million children in the United States are exposed to domestic
violence each year. SHARMILA LAWRENCE, NAT’L CTR. FOR CHILDREN IN POVERTY, DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE AND WELFARE POLICY: RESEARCH FINDINGS THAT CAN INFORM POLICIES ON
MARRIAGE AND CHILD WELL-BEING 5 (2002), available at http://www.researchforum.org/
media/DomVio.pdf. When children are involved, the analysis set forth in this Note does not
apply, as there are so many other interests to consider.
205 The victim initiated the interference in the sense that the victim called the police or
requested that the spouse be arrested.
206 The victim ratified the interference in the sense that the victim participated in the
prosecution.
207 See O’Connor, supra note 8 (raising similar concerns but framing her argument as a
claim based on the victim’s right to privacy).
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This is not to say the effort is misplaced or criminal protective orders are a mis-
guided method, but it is a red flag that prosecutorial methods have begun to cross their
constitutional bounds.  Mandatory arrest, no-drop policies, and criminal protective
orders are all valuable tools in a prosecutor’s effort to fight domestic violence, but
the effect these tools can have on a victim should not and cannot be taken lightly. 
A society free of domestic violence is as worthy a cause as exists in the world of law
enforcement, but the current methods of achieving this goal can come at the cost of
victim autonomy.  The task of balancing those sometimes competing interests is not
easy, but the constitutional concerns discussed in this Note serve as a reminder of the
importance of finding that balance.
